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Abstract: This paper is a proof-of-concept demonstration for a specific digital signatures vulnerability that 
shows the ineffectiveness of the WYSIWYS (What You See Is What You Sign) concept. The algorithm is fairly 
simple: the attacker generates a polymorphic file that has two different types of content (text, as a PDF 
document for example, and image: TIFF – two of the most widely used file formats). When the victim signs the 
dual content file, he/ she only sees a PDF document and is unaware of the hidden content inside the file. After 
obtaining the legally signed document from the victim, the attacker simply has to change the extension to the 
other file format. This will not invalidate the digital signature, as no bits were altered. The destructive potential of 
the attack is considerable, as the Portable Document Format (PDF) is widely used in e-government and in e-
business contexts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The digital signature, as defined by Diffie 
and Hellman [1], is a widespread 
application of asymmetric key 
cryptography, whose purpose is to ensure 
the integrity of the signed documents and 
to guarantee the identity of the signer. In 
many countries, digital signatures can 
legally substitute handwritten signatures 
[2] and are widely used in e-business and 
e-government activities. 
To digitally sign a document, one must 
first generate a hash of the original file 
and encrypt this digest using the private 
key of an asymmetric algorithm (RSA 
being one of the most popular). Any 
tampering will automatically invalidate the 
signature, as the hash value calculated 
during decryption will not match the 
original. 
However, digital signatures aren’t perfect, 
as they allow the content of a file to be 
displayed dynamically [3], depending on 
various instructions included in the file 
(PDF files can incorporate JavaScript 
sequences, for example). This function is 
useful if you would like to have a quotation 
document updated automatically with the 
latest exchange rates. Dynamic content 
does not invalidate a digital signature and 
gives attackers a whole new area to 
explore (and to exploit). To get around 
this, the WYSIWYS (What You See Is What 
You Sign) concept was introduced. In 
short, because the binary and hex 
interpretations of a document are 
incomprehensible to most people, the file 
is converted into a static image (like BMP 
or TIFF) before being signed. 
By exploiting the file structures of various 
text and image formats, an attacker can 
obtain a legally signed document, but 
whose content differs from the one that 
the signer originally approved. 
 
2. Preliminary Info 
 
Thus, what the user sees on the screen is 
actually not what he signs. As stated 
above, the mechanism is straight forward: 
thettacker generates a dual file that 
includes both a PDF document and a TIFF 
image. When the victim signs the 
polymorphic file, he/ she only sees a PDF 
file and is unaware of the hidden content. 
After obtaining the legally signed 
document from the victim, the attacker 
simply has to change the extension to the 
This is a post conference paper. Parts of 
this paper have been published in the 
Proceedings of the 3rd International 
Conference on Security for Information 
Technology and Communications, SECITC 
2010 Conference (printed version). 
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other file format. This will not invalidate 
the digital signature, as no bits of the 
actual file were altered. 
This method is known as the Dali Attack, 
named after the famous painter [4], [5]. 
The first demonstration of the attack was 
based on BMP and HTML files. Assume the 
following scenario: the CEO of a company 
wants to grant 100,000 Euros to the 
financial department, so he asks the CFO 
to write up a document. To ensure there 
are no hidden macros or scripts, the CEO 
demands a scanned BMP copy of the 
document. The CFO, who is the attacker in 
this scenario, wants to gain more funds, so 
he inserts a hidden HTML code inside the 
image file. This code is actually the same 
document, where the 100,000 Euros 
amount is changed to 1 million Euros. 
When the CEO digitally signs the 
Grant.bmp file, he is unaware of the 
hidden code behind the document. His 
smartcard device or software-based 
cryptography application generates the 
Grant.bmp.p7m file (PKCS#7). The file 
then goes back to the CFO, who changes 
the extension to Grant.htm.p7m. Because 
the digital signature verification is done 
solely by comparing the bits that make up 
the PKCS container (of which none 
references the filename or extension), the 
signature will still be valid. 
If one would open the file with an image 
viewer, one would still get the original 
document, with the approved 100,000 
Euros amount. However, because the 
extension was changed to HTML, the 
operating system will automatically use a 
web browser to open the file, thus 
displaying the modified text. 
The biggest problem of this kind of attack 
is the use of HTML files, that aren’t usually 
encountered in a typical corporate 
document workflow. Plus, an HTML text file 
that is over 2 MB will surely raise 
suspicions. 
The Dali Attack can be improved by using 
TIFF and PDF files that have a very flexible 
structure. For example, TIFF files allow 
you to store image parameters (resolution, 
dimensions etc.) anywhere inside the file. 
On the other hand, PDF documents are 
read from the end of the file towards the 
beginning and the header can be placed 
anywhere within the first 1,024 bytes of 
the file. 
If executed correctly, the attacker can 
generate an almost undetectable 
polymorphic file, which can be used for 
fraud in practically any environment that 
relies on PDF for the internal document 
workflow. 
Before describing the attack in detail, we 
must first take a look at the basics of the 
PDF and TIFF file structures. 
 
2.1. The PDF File Structure 
PDF is a platform independent standard 
developed by Adobe Systems for electronic 
documents exchange. The main sections of 
the PDF format are [7]: 
 Header – identifies the PDF version (for 
compatibility reasons); it is usually 
defined as %PDF-1.X[EOL], where X is 
in range {0, 7 > the latest version of 
Acrobat, 9.0}, and EOL is the End-of-
Line marker, usually CR (Carriage 
Return, 0D in hex), LF (Line Feed, 0A 
in hex) or both. It can occur anywhere 
within the first 1,024 bytes of the file; 
 Body – the visual components of the 
file (text, images, fonts, pages layout, 
objects etc.); 
 Xref (Cross-reference Table) – pointers 
and other information about the 
various embedded objects; it allows 
Adobe Reader to find objects anywhere 
within document, by searching for the 
corresponding offset. Thus, the PDF 
viewer doesn’t have to scan the whole 
file to find an object. 
 Trailer – specifies the location of the 
Xref Table and of other objects. 
 The PDF format is designed to be read 
from the end, in order to quickly find 
the Xref Table. The last line of the 
document must contain the %%EOF 
marker (End-of-File). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic file structure 
of a PDF file. 
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Figure 1: Outline of the PDF format structure 
 
2.2 The TIFF File Structure 
TIFF, a format widely used for 
manipulating high resolution images, was 
developed by Aldus, a company acquired 
by Adobe Systems in 1994. TIFF has a 
very flexible structure, which envelops all 
the image data in structures called IFDs 
(Image File Directories). IFDs are two-
dimensional arrays that specify image 
resolution, compression, the total number 
of colours used etc., as well as the 
pointers that define the offsets of these 
parameters. 
Because IFDs can be placed anywhere 
within the TIFF file, the document must 
contain a pointer to the first IFD. This 
pointer is placed inside the eight byte 
header of the TIFF file. 
The first two bytes identify the TIFF format 
and byte order (4949 [hex] or “II” [ASCII] 
for little-endian and 4D4D [hex] or “MM” 
[ASCII] for big-endian). The next two 
bytes are the so-called “magic number” 
(002A [hex] or 42 [decimal]), also used to 
identify the TIFF format. The last four 
bytes of the header are the offset (starting 
address) of the first IFD. The TIFF 
specifications [6] do not specify 
constraints in regard to this offset, which 
means it can even be placed at the end of 
the file. This is a huge advantage for the 
attacker – he has the possibility to insert 
an arbitrary code (in this case a PDF 
document) immediately after the header. 
 
An IFD structure starts with a two byte 
sequence that specifies the total number 
of directories (components). The last four 
bytes define the offset of the next IFD (if it 
exists). In between, there are multiple 12- 
byte one-dimensional arrays that define all 
of the image parameters and are 
structured as follows: 
 Bytes 0-1: Tag – the identifier; 
 Bytes 2-3: Type (Byte/0001h, 
unsigned int, 8b; ASCII/0002h, 
 7b+NUL; Short/0003h, unsigned int, 
16b; Long/0004h, unsigned int, 32b; 
Rational/0005h, 2xLong); TIFF 
Revision 6.0 includes seven types 
(signed versions of the above 
mentioned types, plus Float/0011h and 
Double/0012h); 
 Bytes 4-7: Count (Length) – the total 
number of values; 
 Bytes 8-11: Value/ Offset – specifies 
the address (byte-wise) where the 
value of the field is stored at; the field 
contains the actual value if and only if 
it is smaller than 4 bytes. 
 
Black and white images can be defined 
using just the following IFD subfields: 
 PhotometricInterpretation/0106h; 
 Compression/0103h; 
 ImageLength/0101h; 
 ImageWidth/0100h; 
 ResolutionUnit/0128h; 
 XResolution/011Ah; 
 YResolution/011Bh; 
 RowsPerStrip*/0116h; 
 StripOffsets*/0111h; 
 StripByteCounts*/0117h; 
 
* The TIFF image is split into strips, which 
make it easier to edit the image and also 
optimizes the input/ output buffer. Thus, 
similarly to PDF files, the image viewer 
does not have to scan the whole file to find 
a specific parameter. 
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Greyscale images have an additional field 
called BitsPerSample/0102h, while full RGB 
(Red, Green, Blue) images also use the 
SamplesPerPixel/0115h field. 
 
The general structure of an IFD and that of 
a TIFF file are described in Figures 2 and 
3. 
 
Figure 2. The header and first IDF of a TIFF file 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The hex outline of a TIFF file 
 
Note: Fields like Date/ Time, Software, 
Artist, ICCProfile are optional and most 
image viewers and editors are designed to 
ignore them if the data is non-
interpretable. 
 
3. Embedding the Malicious 
Content 
 
The goal of the attack is to obtain a dual 
PDF/ TIFF file that shows the two different 
types of content by changing the file 
extension. The flexible structure of the 
TIFF format allows the insertion of 
arbitrary code without the risk of 
corrupting the file. However, when any 
additional number of bytes are added, to 
pointers are shifted, and therefore it is 
necessary to manually adjust the offsets of 
the header and of the IFD components. 
PDF is also a good choice for this type of 
attack, because the header can be placed 
anywhere within the first 1,024 bytes, 
which means that it can be preceded by an 
eight byte sequence that is actually a TIFF 
header. 
We will consider the scenario described in 
Chapter 2: the CFO of a company wants to 
gain access to funds of 1 million Euros, 
rather than the approved 100,000 Euros. 
The first step is to generate the two files – 
Contract.pdf and Contract.tif (containing 
the modified amount). Then, we copy the 
whole content of the PDF file after the first 
eight bytes of the TIFF image. At the end 
of the new polymorphic file, we add the 
trailer (last few bytes) of the PDF 
document, in order to preserve 
compatibility with Adobe Reader. All the 
operations can be done using any hex 
editor. I opted for Hex Workshop 4.2. At 
this point, the polymorphic file can be 
opened by Adobe Reader, but image 
viewers return an error because the offsets 
are wrong. 
Next, we must modify the header, which 
contains the offset of the first IFD, 
respectively the last four bytes of the 
4949.2A00.0800.0000 sequence. In the 
original file, the 8h address corresponds to 
the 1700.FE00.0400.0100 sequence. After 
inserting the PDF file, all values are shifted 
with the byte-value equivalent of the PDF 
document (6,009 bytes). To determine the 
new IFD position, we must add this value 
to the original position. In hex, 6,009 is 
1779h. Thus, 1779h + 0008h = 1781h. 
Another method to determine the new 
offset (which is the method used in the 
video file on the CD submitted with this 
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paper), is to search for the 
1700.FE00.0400.0100 sequence in the 
polymorphic file – which will point to the 
1781h location, as below: 
 
 
Figure 4. The new location of the IFD Now, all we 
have to do is change the header to 
4949.2A00.8117.0000 (1781h becomes 8171h in 
big-endian). 
 
The same process has to be repeated for 
most of the IFD parameters. To identify 
them more easily, I used an application 
called AsTiffTagViewer 2.0. 
For the polymorphic file to be nearly 
identical to the original TIFF file, the 
following fields must be changed: 
BitsPerSample, XResolution, YResolution 
and StripOffsets. For a more convincing 
result, one should also adjust the other 
readable fields (username, the software 
used to generate the file, the date and 
time of creation etc.). 
Table 1, available at the end of this paper, 
illustrates all of the changes that must be 
made to the polymorphic file. 
After this, the finished polymorphic file 
Contract.pdf.tif, which will be renamed 
Contract.pdf to fool the victim, can be 
opened without error by Adobe Reader or 
Foxit Reader. Furthermore, when analyzed 
by the Preflight tool in Acrobat 
Professional, the polymorphic file appears 
to be a standard PDF file, with no syntax 
errors.  
Accessed with any image viewer, the 
polymorphic file will display the malicious 
content. The only tool that detects any 
irregularities with the file is Adobe 
Photoshop, which simply states the image 
has data that cannot be read. After this, 
the attacker sends the polymorphic file to 
his victim, who signs it using a smartcard 
device or a software solution capable of 
handling digital certificates. 
The resulting Contract.pdf.pkcs7 file will 
pass signature verification, because all the 
malicious modifications were made before 
signing. When decoded with signature 
verification software, the user will view the 
original PDF document, with the 100,000 
Euros amount. To complete the attack, the 
attacker must change the filename 
extension from Contract.pdf.pcks7 to 
Contract.tif.pkcs7. The digital signature 
verification process will once again pass 
(see Figure 5 below), because the bits that 
make up the PKCS#7 message contain no 
information about the extension of the file. 
Any operating system will then interpret 
the polymorphic file by its new extension 
(TIFF) and open it with an image viewer, 
displaying the modified 1 million Euros 
amount. 
This type of attack also works for 
password protected PDF documents (RC4 
or AES), as well as PDF/A documents 
(used for long term archiving), PDF/E 
documents (used for engineering 
workflows) and PDF/X documents (used in 
the desktop publishing and prepress 
industry). 
It is also worth mentioning that the Dali 
Attack is quite difficult to detect because it 
does not cause direct damage to the victim 
(like credit card fraud for example). The 
attacker gains an advantage that he can 
exploit sometime in the future. 
 
4. Methods of Detection 
 
I have identified seven different solutions 
(freeware or commercial) that could help 
in identifying a supposed polymorphic file. 
Some methods are for the tech savvy 
persons that are willing to open the 
suspicious file with a hex editor (a direct 
method of identifying any tampering) or 
with Adobe Photoshop (that will detect any 
errors in the TIFF format). 
In the case of PDF/A files, the Preflight tool 
in Adobe Acrobat Professional will detect 
syntax errors if the file is put through the 
PDF/A-1b standard compliancy test. This 
standard states that the PDF header must 
begin with %PDF-1.X, and cannot start 
with an arbitrary code. 
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Figure 5: Signature verification of the polymorphic file (renamed to Contract.tif.pkcs7) 
 
On the other hand, if a user already 
owns Acrobat Professional, then he has a 
sure method of disarming any kind of 
Dali Attack, because the proprietary 
Adobe signature software rewrites the 
whole document, eliminating any prior 
modifications [8]. Another complex 
method would be to include the filename 
or corresponding MIME ContentType in 
the PKCS#7 container. Thus, the 
signature verification software would 
detect when the attacker tries to change 
the extension. 
One could also develop a heuristic 
application that could search for patterns 
specific to the Dali Attack. Any 
inexperienced user could then detect an 
attack. 
However, because developing such an 
application is fairly complex (requiring 
implementing CMS and PKCS#7 libraries 
in IDEs like .NET), I have developed a 
simple batch program that can detect 
the attack and then display the TIFF 
image hidden inside a PDF document. 
This batch is intended to be run before 
signing a suspicious file. The underlying 
principle is simple: using a tool from the 
ImageMagick 6.6 suite, we search for 
TIFF image specific parameters inside a 
PDF document (like dimensions, 
resolution, color depth etc.). If they are 
present, then the file might be 
polymorphic. The batch then duplicates 
the file, renames it to TIFF and opens 
the default image viewer. The Identify 
tool from ImageMagick can also detect 
PDF specific fields (like format: 
application/pdf and 
pdf:Producer:Acrobat Distiller 8.1.0), 
meaning it can also be used to detect 
images that have a PDF document 
hidden inside. 
The batch file (compiled for both x32 
and x64 platforms) is included on the CD 
submitted with this paper. 
Figure 6 below shows the output of the 
batch program, that has detected TIFF 
parameters inside a PDF file.
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Figure 6. The output of the batch program designed to detect polymorphic file 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper and the video attached to it 
describe in detail a new digital 
signatures exploit that allows an 
attacker to trick his victim into signing a 
document he/ she did not approve. The 
attack is not based on embedding 
dynamic content (like macros in 
Microsoft Word) or accessing external 
components (such as fonts in a PDF file), 
but rather on creating a polymorphic file 
with two types of content 
– TIFF and PDF – one being the original 
document and the other, the modified 
malicious copy. Thus, the victim is 
unaware of signing another document 
hidden behind the one displayed on 
screen. The destructive potential of the 
attack is considerable, as both PDF and 
TIFF are widely used in e-government 
activities, respectively in the corporate 
environment. 
I have also listed the main methods of 
detecting or disarming this type of 
attack, including an application I have 
developed myself. 
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